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Righting the Wrong of Woytus:
A Proposal for Adoption of a Rule in
Missouri Creating a New Category of
Depositions Which May be Used for
Discovery Purposes Only
PaulM. Brown*
PaulA. Kidwell'"
In State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan,1 the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that
plaintiffs in personal injury cases may not be compelled to execute authorizations granting defense counsel permission to conduct ex parte interviews of
the plaintiff's treating physicians. In so ruling, the court expressed a desire
to strike a balance between the interest, of personal injury plaintiffs in
preserving the physician/patient privilege and the interest of personal injury
defendants in obtaining full and fair disclosure of relevant information through
discovery. A closer look, however, at the practical effects of the court's
decision discloses that the ruling puts defense counsel at a serious disadvantage in preparing personal injury cases for trial. A new rule permitting
depositions which may be used for discovery purposes only is needed to
ameliorate the harsh effect of the decision.
I. BACKGROUND

The question of whether a court may compel execution of authorizations
granting defense counsel permission to conduct ex parte interviews of the
plaintiff's treating physicians was first addressed in Missouri in the case of
State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist.2 In Stufflebam, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Southern District, held that the defendant in a personal injury action
may obtain a court order compelling the plaintiff to execute authorizations for
release of medical records which include a provision granting defense counsel

* J.D. University of Missouri-Columbia, 1979. Paul M. Brown is a partner with
Cobum, Croft & Putzell and served as Associate Editor-in-Chief of the Missouri Law
Review.
** J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1988. Mr. Kidwell is an associate
with Cobum, Croft & Putzell and was a member of the Missouri Law Review.
1. 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
2. 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), overruled,State ex reL Woytus v. Ryan,
776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
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permission to interview the plaintiff's treating physicians.3 In so ruling, the
Stufflebam court chose to follow the rationale of several other court decisions
upholding such orders on the grounds that exparte interviews are an effective
and cost efficient method of informal discovery which facilitates early
settlement and eliminates non-essential witnesses at trial.4 The Stufflebain
court reasoned that no party has a proprietary right to any witness' testimony,
unless the information is privileged, since either party may proceed by any
lawful manner to discover what a witness knows,5 and that the
physician/patient privilege is waived by the filing of a personal injury suit to
the extent the information sought is relevant to issues raised by the
pleadings. 6
The Stufflebam court rejected an argument by the plaintiff that ex parte
interviews are subject to abuse by defense counsel and threaten the integrity
of the physician/patient relationship. The court found nothing in the record
to support such an argument and concluded that for it to assume such abuse
by attorneys and physicians would "denigrate the integrity of their respective
professions. 7
Stufflebam was overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel
Woytus v. Ryan.8 In Woytus, the trial court, acting under the authority of
Stufflebam, entered an order compelling the plaintiff to execute authorizations
for release of medical records which included a provision authorizing ex pare
interviews of the plaintiff's treating physicians. 9 The plaintiff, who had
designated her treating physicians as expert witnesses, filed a petition for writ
of prohibition in the Missouri Court of Appeals on the grounds that Rule
56.01(b)(4) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide for
discovery of expert witness testimony by exparte interview and that the only
proper methods of discovering expert witness testimony are interrogatories and
depositions."° The court of appeals agreed in large part and entered an order

3. Id. at 888.
4. Id. See Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D. D.C. 1983); Langdon
v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987) (citing Arctic Motor Freight, Inc. v. Stover,
571 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1977)); Trans-World Investments v. Drobney, 554 P.2d 1148
(Alaska 1976); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Stempler
v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985). See also Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So.2d
858 (Fla. 1984); Orr v. Sievert, 292 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
5. Stufflebam, 694 S.W.2d at 888 (quoting Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D.
126, 128 (D. D.C. 1983)).
6. Id. at 885.
7. Id. at 888.
8. 776 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
9. Id. at 390-91.
10. Id. at 391.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/8
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of prohibition enjoining the trial court from enforcing its order compelling
plaintiff to execute the authorizations." The court, however, did not ban ex
parte interviews by defense counsel altogether. Instead, the Court ruled that
while opinions developed by the physician as an expert witness are subject to
the discovery limitations of Rule 56.01(b)(4),information relating to the

physician's diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff prior to the physician being
retained as an expert are subject to discovery by ex parte interview. 2
The Missouri Supreme Court accepted transfer of the Woytus case and
reversed the trial court's order in all respects, expressly overruling Stufflebam
in the process. 3 The Supreme Court ruled that ex parte interviews of the
plaintiff's treating physicians by defense counsel posed a risk to the
physician/patient privilege which outweighed any benefit that might be gained
by permitting them. 4 The Supreme Court rejected arguments by the
defendant that ex parte interviews would conserve medical resources 5 and
facilitate early settlement.1 6 The court also held that protective orders and
in limine relief would not provide adequate protection against potential abuses
of the physician/patient privilege.17 Consequently, personal injury plaintiffs
may no longer be compelled to execute authorizations for release of medical
records granting defense counsel permission to conduct exparte interviews of
the plaintiff's treating physicians.
II. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY WOYTuS

Woytus places defendants in personal injury cases at a distinct disadvantage in preparing the medical aspects of the case for trial by depriving defense
counsel of their most effective means of determining the substance of a
medical witness's testimony in advance of trial. Although the defendant may
obtain discovery of the plaintiff's treating physicians by deposition pursuant
to Rule 54.03(b)(4), this is not an adequate substitute for the ex parte

11. Woytus v. Ryan, No. 54752, slip op. at 6-7, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. September 13,
1988).

12. Id. at 7. Other courts which have examined this issue agree that facts and
opinions developed by an expert prior to being endorsed as an expert are not subject
to discovery limitations relating to expert testimony. See, e.g., Barkwell v. Sturm
Ruger Co., 79 F.R.D. 444, 446 (D. Alaska 1978); Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 80
F.R.D. 489, 490-91 (D. Mont. 1978); Nelco Corp. v. Slater Elec., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 411,
414 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. Woytus, 776 S.W.2d at 395.
14. Id. at 394.
15. Id.

16. Id. at 394-95.
17. Id.
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interview since, under the present rules of Civil Procedure, there is nothing to
prevent plaintiff's counsel from qualifying the witness on cross-examination
and using the deposition to preserve the witness's testimony for trial, thus
depriving defense counsel of his only opportunity to evaluate the witness's
testimony and prepare for cross-examination in advance of the testimony being
preserved for trial.
Plaintiff's counsel would have several reasons for preserving a treating
physician's trial testimony in a deposition noticed by defense counsel for
discovery purposes rather than calling the witness at trial or noticing a
separate deposition. These include: (1) not having to pay the witness's
professional fee; (2) gaining the advantage of developing the witness's
testimony by leading questions; and (3) forcing defense counsel to
cross-examine the witness without the benefit of advance preparation.18
Faced with the prospect of plaintiff's counsel developing the witness's
trial testimony on cross-examination, defense counsel may choose not to
depose the physician in advance of trial. When that happens, defense counsel
is deprived of his most effective means of making an informed decision on
whether to call the physician to testify at trial (either live or by deposition)
and preparing an effective cross-examination if the physician is called to
testify by the plaintiff. Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, whose

ability to conduct ex parte interviews of his client's treating physicians is
unaffected by Woytus, continues to be able to conduct informal discovery of

medical witnesses (except the defendant's examining physician) and to make
informed decisions on these matters.

18. Where plaintiff preserves a treating physician's trial testimony in a deposition
noticed by defense counsel for discovery purposes, defense counsel's cross-examination
of the witness will likely be less effective than if plaintiff waits and takes a second
deposition or calls the witness at trial because:
1. Defense counsel's handwritten notes, if any, from his direct examination
of the physician may be too sketchy or too illegible to be used effectively to
cross-examine the witness.
2. Defense counsel has not had an opportunity to organize his notes into
an effective and concise cross-examination of the weakest links in the physician's
testimony.
3. Defense counsel has not had an opportunity to consult with his own
experts or to review authoritative treatises to identify weaknesses or inconsistencies in the physician's testimony.
4. Defense counsel has not had an opportunity to have tests performed to
challenge the assumptions, studies, or tests upon which the physician's testimony
is based.
5. Defense counsel may be simply caught off-guard at having to conduct
cross-examination of the physician's trial testimony in a deposition he had
intended for discovery purposes only.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/8
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Under the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, there is nothing to prevent
plaintiff's counsel from preserving the testimony of plaintiff's treating
physicians in a deposition noticed by defense counsel for purposes of
discovering the physician's anticipated trial testimony. Rule 57.03 provides
that a witness who has been noticed for deposition by one party may be
examined by any other party on any subject so long as written notice of the
party's intention to examine the witness is given to opposing counsel prior to
or during the deposition. 9 Defense counsel may not protect himself from
such a "blind-side" by objecting to plaintiff's comprehensive cross-examination of the witness on the grounds that the testimony "exceeds the proper
scope of cross-examination" since the scope of cross-examination in Missouri
is limited only by the trial court's discretion.20
Theoretically, a defendant who wishes to depose the plaintiff's treating
physicians without risking that the physician's testimony will be preserved for
trial by plaintiff's counsel through cross-examination may seek a protective
order pursuant to Rule 56.01(c). 2' Such an order could either prohibit
22
plaintiff's counsel from cross-examining the witness in the same deposition

19. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.03(b)(5) provides:
When the party causing a deposition or depositions to be taken under a
notice shall have completed the taking thereof, any other party may, before
the same or any other officer authorized to take depositions, and at the
same place, proceed immediately, or on the next day, to take any depositions he may desire... ; but to do so, he shall, before or during the time
of the taking of the depositions on behalf of the other party, give all other
parties, or the attorneys representing them, notice in writing of his intention
to do so ....
20. See, e.g., Krez v. Michel, 431 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. 1968); Powell v. Norman
Lines, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 191, 195-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); see also Bennett v.
Strodtman, 42 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (in a deposition, any question

relevant to the subject matter is proper).
21. Mo. R. CIv. P. 56.01(c)l provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression or undue burden or expense; including one or more of the
following:
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including a designation of time and place;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of
discovery be limited to certain matters ....
22. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(c)(4).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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or prohibit plaintiff's counsel from reading the deposition into evidence.23
Unfortunately, it has been the authors' experience that Missouri circuit judges
are unwilling to enter such orders since the Rules of Civil Procedure do not
expressly forbid a party from using an opposing party's "discovery" deposition
to preserve a witness's testimony for trial.
Now that Woytus prevents defense counsel from having equal access to
plaintiff's treating physicians, defense counsel has the following options in
deciding whether or not to take the deposition of the plaintiff's treating
physicians and preparing for cross-examination in the event they are called by
the plaintiff (either live or by deposition):
1. Base the decision solely on information contained in the treating
physician's medical records and reports.
2. Ask plaintiff's counsel to agree to a joint interview of the treating
physician.
3. Take a deposition of the treating physician, being careful not to
qualify him as an expert or lay a foundation for the deposition being
introduced into evidence and hoping that opposing counsel does not do so on
cross-examination.
The first option, relying solely on the physician's medical records, is the
option most often elected by defense counsel; however, it is inadequate for at
least two reasons, particularly if the "treating physician" is, in fact, an
advocate for the plaintiff who began seeing the plaintiff on referral from the
plaintiff's attorney. First, the physicians' handwriting may be so illegible as
to require a deposition or interview of the doctor just to decipher the doctor's
office chart. Second, the physician's opinions relating to causation, prognosis,
permanency, and extent of disability are unlikely to be contained in his office
notes. These can be determined only by interview or deposition.
Clearly, defense counsel is at a distinct disadvantage if he must prepare
for cross-examination of the plaintiff's treating physician without having first
interviewed or deposed the witness, particularly since plaintiff's counsel can,
and usually will, schedule an ex parte interview of the physician prior to the
deposition pursuant to an authorization from his willing client.
The second option, a joint interview of the witness, is a potential solution
to the problem created by Woylus; however, few plaintiffs' counsel will agree
to a joint interview as long as Woytus is the law of the land. An attorney
representing a personal injury plaintiff who willingly would consent to a joint
interview, when he can interview the physician ex parte and shut out defense
counsel, is not vigorously representing his client's interest. Obviously, the
second option is not going to be available to defense counsel in very many
cases.

23. See Mo. R. Civ. P..56.01(c)(2).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/8
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The third option, a deposition of the physician without qualifying him as
an expert or laying a foundation for the deposition being read into evidence
trial, is fraught with peril since there is nothing to prevent plaintiff's counsel
from qualifying the witness and eliciting his trial testimony on cross-examination. When that occurs, the only thing defendant accomplishes by taking the
physician's deposition is getting to pay the witness's professional fee, an item
of expense which otherwise would be borne by the plaintiff. 24 This dilemma potentially exists with respect to any expert witness;
however, it is much more likely to arise with respect to the plaintiff's treating
physicians since most expert witnesses who are specifically retained as experts
will be brought into court to testify live. On the other hand, treating
physicians, whether endorsed as experts or simply called to testify regarding
their diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff, are less likely to be asked to
appear at trial. Instead, their testimony will be presented by deposition. This
is due, in part, to the treating physician's need to remain in his office to care
for his patients and, in part, to the unwillingness or inability of many
physicians to juggle their schedules and make the other accommodations
required for a live courtroom appearance. In addition, the Missouri Rules of
Civil Procedure encourage the current Missouri practice of presenting most
medical testimony by deposition rather than by an appearance at trial since the
Rules permit a physician's deposition to be read into evidence without a
showing that the physician is unavailable to appear at trial.25 Nonetheless,
because the problem described above may arise with respect to any expert
witness, the solution proposed in this article for righting the wrong of Woytus
covers non-physician as well as physician witnesses.
A change in the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure is needed to resolve
the problem presented by Woytus. Both counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for
defendants must be allowed to depose an opposing party's expert witness
without the witness being qualified as an expert and his testimony being
preserved for use at trial by opposing counsel on cross-examination. Defense
counsel, in particular, need to be able to depose the plaintiff's treating
physicians to discover the substance of their opinions and conclusions without
running the risk that plaintiff's counsel will qualify the witness as an expert
and elicit his trial testimony on cross-examination. Nothing short of adoption

24. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4)(b) provides that "[u]nless manifest injustice would
result, the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for responding to discovery by deposition."
25. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.07(a)(3) provides:
The deposition of any witness who is not present in court may be used by
a party for any purpose if the court finds:.., that the witness is ... a
practicing... physician and engaged in the discharge of his... professional duty at the time of trial.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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of a new rule allowing depositions to be used for discovery purposes only will
resolve this problem.
III. THE SOLUTION
The authors have discussed this dilemma with defense counsel from other
parts of the country, and it appears that the problem is not as serious in many
other states as it is in Missouri. This is because in most states, a physician's
deposition may not be read into evidence without showing that the physician
is unavailable to appear at trial by reason of death, infirmity or distance from
Consequently, in these states, most
his residence to the courthouse.'
medical testimony is presented by bringing the physician into the courtroom
to testify live. In Missouri, all that must be shown before a physician's
deposition may be read into evidence is that his attention to his professional
duties would preclude his appearing at trial.2 7
In states where a physician must be shown to be unavailable before his
deposition may be read into evidence, defense counsel may take a deposition
of plaintiff's treating physicians with a fair degree of assurance that the
deposition will not be read into evidence by opposing counsel at trial. In
those states, if the physician's testimony is to be heard, the physician must be
summoned to court to testify live unless he is unavailable. Thus, defense
counsel has the means in those states, by way of deposition, to (1) discover
the physician's opinions and conclusions in advance of the witness's testimony
being preserved for or elicited at trial; (2) make an informed decision as to
whether the physician ought to be called to testify as a witness for the
defense; (3) anticipate whether the physician is likely to be called by the
plaintiff at trial; and (4) prepare an effective cross-examination of the
physician's anticipated trial testimony. Nonetheless, adoption of a more
restrictive rule in Missouri regarding the reading of physician depositions into

26. Only twelve states, including Missouri, permit a physician's deposition to be
read into evidence without a showing that the physician is unavailable to appear at trial
by reason of death, infirmity, or distance from his residence to the courthouse. They
are: Alabama, ALA. R. CIV. PROC. 32(a)(3)(D); Connecticut, CONN. R. SUPER. CT. §
248; Florida, FLA. R. Civ. PROC. 1.330; Illinois, ILL. Sup. CT. R. 212(b) (applies only
to evidence depositions taken pursuant to the Illinois Rules of Civil Procedure);
Kentucky, Ky. R. CIV. PROC. 32.01(c)(vi); North Carolina, N.C. R. CIV. PROC.
32(a)(4) (applies only to video-taped depositions); Ohio, OHIO Civ. R. 32(3)(e);
Oklahoma, OKLA. R. CIV. PROC. § 3232 (applies to all experts); Pennsylvania, PENN.
R. CIV. PROC. 4017.1(g) (applies only to video-taped depositions); Virginia, VA. SUP.
CT. R. 4:7(a)(4) (applies only if the physician "in the regular course of his profession,
treated or examined any party to the proceeding"); and Wisconsin, Wis. R. Civ. PROC.
804.07(1)(c).
27. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 57.07(a)(3)(C).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/8
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evidence is not the solution to the dilemma presented by Woytus. Instead, the
Missouri Supreme Court should consider adoption of a rule which provides for
the taking of "discovery" depositions; that is, depositions taken for purposes
of discovery which may not be used at trial except for impeachment.
Several states, including neighboring Illinois, already have "discovery"
depositions. 28 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 202, which provides for both
"evidence" depositions and "discovery" depositions, would provide a good
model for Missouri if this state were to adopt a rule allowing "discovery"
depositions.
In Illinois, an "evidence" deposition may be introduced into evidence at
trial and used for any purpose on a showing of the witness' unavailability.29
Furthermore, an "evidence" deposition of a physician or surgeon may be
admitted into evidence regardless of the witness's availability. 0 "Discovery"
depositions, on the other hand, may be used only for impeachment, as an
admission of a party, or as evidence of a fact if it falls within an exception to
the hearsay rule.31 Subject to these few exceptions, "discovery" depositions
may not be introduced into evidence even though the witness is unavailable.32 In other words,, discovery depositions have basically the same
evidentiary status as an ex parte statement.
Illinois does not permit defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews
of a personal injury plaintiff's treating physicians; 33 however, the problems
presented by Woytus do not exist in Illinois because of the Illinois rule
permitting "discovery" depositions. In Illinois, defense counsel may take a
"discovery" deposition of a personal injury plaintiff's treating physicians
pursuant to Rule 202 without being concerned that plaintiff's counsel will
qualify him as an expert and elicit his trial testimony on cross-examination.
If a party wishes to take a deposition to be read into evidence, they must
notice and take a separate "evidence" deposition.
The Illinois rule permitting "discovery" depositions enables defense
counsel in Illinois to evaluate the testimony of plaintiff's treating physicians
in advance of trial, to determine whether or not to call them to testify at trial

28. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 202. The other states which provide for depositions which
may be used for discovery purposes only are: California, CALIF. CODE CIV. P. §
2025(d)(6), (i)(3); Maryland, M. CODE CIV. P. § 2-416(b); New Jersey, N.J. R. Civ.
P. 4:14-9; Oregon, OR. R. Civ. P. 39(1); Rhode Island, R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3),
30(b)(2); and Tennessee, TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4), 32.01(3).
29. 111. Sup. Ct. R. 212(b).
30. Id.
31. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 212(a).

32. Id.
33. See Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 I1l. App. 3d 581, 588,499 N.E.2d
952, 959 (1986).
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(either by a separate "evidence" deposition or by bringing them into the
courtroom to testify live) and to prepare to cross-examine them if they are
called by opposing counsel. Thus, in Illinois, defense counsel is on a more
equal footing with plaintiff's counsel in preparing the medical aspects of a
personal injury case for trial. A similar rule is needed in Missouri to correct
the inequities presented by Woytus.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Woytus disallowing ex parte
interviews by defense counsel of a personal injury plaintiff's treating
physicians places defense counsel at a disadvantage in preparing the medical
aspects of a personal injury case for trial, particularly since plaintiff's counsel
still has the ability to conduct such interviews. Missouri needs to adopt a rule
permitting the taking of "discovery" depositions to remedy the inequities
presented by the Woytus decision and to put defense counsel on a more equal
footing with plaintiff's counsel in preparing personal injury cases for trial.
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